Evolutionary game of subsidy strategy on multi-airport route network under homogeneous competition

To enhance the high-quality collaborative development of multiple airports in the region based on differentiated positioning, the impact of airport subsidy strategies on the evolution of the multi-airport route network was studied, and the optimal subsidy strategy was determined. A double-layer evolutionary game model was constructed based on the competitive game relationships among passengers, airlines, and airports. In the upper-level model, the influence of passengers’ self-learning ability on fares was considered, and a passenger Logit choice model incorporating a self-learning mechanism was constructed. The Hotelling model was then used to analyze the impact of fare competition among airlines on the same route on passenger choice behavior, thereby determining the optimal pricing strategy for airlines under competitive conditions. In the lower-level model, the evolutionary game process of competitive choices between airport subsidies and airlines was analyzed based on the replicator dynamic equation. The synergistic effect of the inter-airport collaborative subsidy strategy and the route network was determined.The results show that for airlines transferring routes, the advantageous discount range for attracting leakage passengers is between 0.6 and 0.75. The fare discounts for airlines competing on the same route should be concentrated between 0.6 and 0.85 to avoid the loss of revenue caused by low price competition. Additionally, the optimization of the route network through airport subsidies reveals that each airport has an optimal subsidy range based on its functional positioning.